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Introduction
In recent months there has been substantial
public discussion of the increase in the
wholesale electricity price in New Zealand, 
and the prospect of rationing of electricity
supply to non-critical users during periods 
of peak demand during the current winter. 
Price increases and the potential for rationing
result from the (statistically) extremely unusual
coincidence of circumstances facing the
electricity industry at present.  These 
circumstances include
• very low rainfall in areas that imply low
inflows to hydro storage lakes, 
• high rates of economic growth
increasing the demand for electricity, 
• sudden very substantial write-downs of
gas reserves in known fields, and 
• high prices for alternative uses of gas in
the form of methanol.  
Discussion of the issues facing the
electricity industry has elicited from some
commentators the suggestion that centralised
government management of entities in the
electricity sector, and in particular, central
government planning of investment in
generation capacity, would have avoided 
the current problems and will reduce the
likelihood of similar problems in the future.
This suggestion is based on a view that higher
electricity prices and potential shortages of
electricity reflect a failure of the current model
of competition between state-owned and
private sector generators and retailers of
electricity.  In this paper we provide an
evaluation of this view.
The Electricity Industry: 
An Overview
Electricity is an industry characterised by high
levels of technical complexity, the need for co-
ordination of continuous delivery of electricity
to meet demand, and the need for co-
ordination of transmission security and
investment.  These needs are met using sophis-
ticated electronic communication and analytical
tools to co-ordinate decentralised decision
making by competing market participants.  
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Co-ordination
Co-ordination is critically important in 
two areas of electricity: the first is the 
co-ordination of the delivery of electricity 
to meet demand continuously and the second
relates to the co-ordination of transmission
and generation investment.
Because electricity cannot be econom-
ically stored, supply has to be matched to
demand continuously at each instant in time.
This is done through the spot market where at
each point in time the dispatcher matches
demand to supply using least-cost offered
generation, across roughly 240 grid exit and
injection points subject to the state of capacity
of the transmission network. At the same time
the quality of electricity is maintained by
ancillary services such as voltage support and
frequency control supplied by actions of the
dispatcher and other (increasingly) automatic
means. 
The spot market provides co-ordination
of short term supply and demand, establishes
spot prices based on demand and the supply
prices bid by generators, and provides surety
for payments between market participants.
The spot market deals only with offers to buy
and sell electricity in this market: other
activities, including long-term supply and
hedge contracts, are outside it. Indeed, the
effect of these other long-term arrangements
is that only a proportion (unknown but say 20-
25%) of total electrical energy is transacted at
spot market prices.1
This decentralised co-ordination means,
for example, that generator owning plants on
a river system can independently decide how
best to manage them subject to environ-
mental resource consents and any other local
factors, including recreation and availability of
water, and offer electricity to the spot market
accordingly. This approach enables decisions
to be taken by those with the best local
knowledge and efficiently negotiated solutions
to local issues.
System Capacity and Investment
System capacity is determined by generation,
transmission and distribution capacity.
Demand and generation interact in
determining desirable grid capacity, and a
governance structure that provides for some
co-ordination and enforcement of rights
relating to transmission and generation
investment is required.2 Investment in
generation and transmission are to a degree
substitutes for the other because investment
in generation requires transmission unless 
it is close to demand. Locational choice of
generators affects the demand for
transmission, and congestion (transmission
capacity) affects spot prices at different
locations on the grid thereby providing
incentives for low cost location of generation. 
Transmission investment is complicated
by externalities produced by AC-current
electricity which follows all available paths to
an extent determined by the paths’ relative
resistances.3 Where there are interconnected
loop networks in the transmission grid,
investment in a path that relaxes congestion
on that particular path will also affect the
capacity of other paths. This externatlity effect
poses issues for the establishment of property
rights on parts of the transmission grid and
therefore issues in tying costs to the benefi-
ciaries of investment. New Zealand is
fortunate in this respect because its grid has
limited loop flows as it is to a large extent a
long network with only one or two significant
loops. It has a long section that is DC electrical
energy that does not suffer the externality
problem. 
A related issue concerns the ability and
desire of some beneficiaries of transmission
investment to free-ride on the investment of
others even when there are no loop flows. 
This is complicated in New Zealand by the fact
that the congestion rentals or profits4 of the
grid are not held by the transmission owner.
Instead, they are passed through to parties
1  Long term arrangements include
contracts of various sorts. They can, and,
in many cases are designed to, ensure
that the buyer and seller is insulated
from the spot price.
2 The new electricity governance structure
currently under consideration explicitly
provides for such a regulatory arrange-
ment. 
3 For a discussion of the economic issues
implied see Steven Stoft, Power System
Economics, 2002, IEEE, Wiley.
4 When relative spot prices are high they
produce congestion revenue over and
above the value of energy losses: much
the same way that good quality land can
produce rents as compared to low quality
land. 
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connected to the grid in order that the grid
owner not profit from grid congestion.
Together with the legal requirement that
generation and retail energy companies must
be separate from distribution lines companies,
this allocation of congestion rentals engenders
a separation between the benefits and costs of
transmission investment. It may be argued
that the separation is addressed contractually
where beneficiaries of transmission
investment negotiate and pay for grid and
lines investment that Transpower or local lines
companies implement.  However, to overcome
the free rider problem a regulatory
governance structure is required that allocates
and enforces associated grid property rights. 
In all conceivable grid governance
arrangements there are investments that
relate to the performance of the grid that
require investment by the grid owner. Here, 
as elsewhere, the interaction with regulatory
rules is critical if such investments are to be
carried out to an appropriate extent. There are
different approaches to regulating the grid in
different countries. In New Zealand
Transpower as grid owner is in essence
required to set charges for the use of its grid
in such a way that a) imparts some volatility
and unpredictability in charges to connected
customers and b) which has a problematic
effect on its financial position for any new
investment it implements. Such regulatory
arrangements can be expected to affect
investment under either a decentralised or
heavily centralised system.
Prices in the Electricity Market
The electricity market establishes prices both
for long-term contracts and sales on the spot
market.  The role of prices is to convey
information and accountability so that
decentralised co-ordination and competition
take place.  Prices that reflect scarcity are
critically important for the location and
amount of generation investment as well as
for the location and management of load
(demand).  Only if prices reflect scarcity will
demand be appropriately responsive to the
cost of energy.  The long-term prices reflect
the commercial judgement of suppliers and
demanders of the future price of electricity,
and the spot prices reflect the congestion of
the grid, electricity demand and the relative
supplies of fuels at the time of dispatch.5
The short-term co-ordination function of
spot prices reflects common knowledge of the
system combined with a competitive tension.
The prices offered by other generators affect
the offers from any particular generator that
are accepted by the auctioneer: thus, there is
generally an incentive to offer generation at
the cost of the fuel that will be consumed by
the generation activity.6 This cost varies
enormously across catchments over time,
depending upon past and expected future
catchment inflows and across thermal plants
depending upon their fuel type.  This cost
variation imparts uncertainty about other
participants’ cost structures that renders price
co-ordination across the generators uncertain,
and therefore provides competitive tension.
This competitive tension is mitigated
somewhat by the fact that each generator
knows the state of all the hydrological systems
at each point in time and this knowledge too
will affect offers. However, since no generator
knows the commitments of other generators
outside the spot market, or their expectations
about the future and hence the value they
place on fuel, competitive tension remains
and is reflected in the offers made. 
In common with all markets for an
undifferentiated good, the electricity price is
set by the marginal cost of supply (and this is
true for both the spot market and for hedge
contracts). Where gas is the most expensive
fuel used it will set the price of electricity even
though approximately 65% of total electricity
is provided by hydrological generation. Of
course in periods of water shortage we have
5 Graeme Guthrie and Steen Videbeck (“The
Marginal Cost of Electricity: what is water
worth?” Competition and Regulation
Times, July 2002) explain how the spot
prices reflect the value of water.
6 See Kevin Counsell, “Uniform vs Pay-As-
Bid Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions”,
mimeo, ISCR (www.iscr.org.nz), 2003.
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the alternative of hydro-generation setting the
price in the market. 
There should be no differentiation in
electricity price across fuel sources for the
following reasons:7
• Electricity is a homogeneous transferable
good, the source of which is usually
impossible to identify, and hence its use
in any demand should carry the same
price;
• The opportunity cost of electricity is the
same for all units of electricity in that
economising on a unit of electricity from
any source will reduce the use of the
marginal fuel (gas); 
• A high price across all units will induce
hydro investment and innovation and a
search for substitutes for gas: to price
according to the cost of electricity by
produced fuel type would de-couple
price and scarcity of fuel and yield the
perverse outcome of negligible demand-
side management or conservation in
times of water scarcity; and  
• If each unit of electricity earned only its
long run marginal cost8 there would be
no incentive to supply unless directed;
particularly since investment is sunk,
uncertainty is so important and
centralised schemes are especially
subject to variations across different
government administrations. 
The Link Between Prices and
Investment in Generation
Most investments in electricity are sunk and
have long engineering lives. Viable investment
therefore requires long-term security of fuel
supply and confidence in long term demand. 
Investment decisions relating to
generation may be affected by the signals
provided by a spot market but, as with fuel
supplies, it will be the prospect of long-term
contracts of electrical energy that will provide
the surety required for investment in
generation.  Although small reliance would be
placed upon the spot market prices directly, in
matching supply and demand over time and
in various hydrological conditions the prices
established in this market will importantly aid
the development of expectations about the
prospects for secure generation investment.  
Spot prices are particularly effective in
reflecting the state of the transmission grid
and the constraints built into it. Price differ-
entials across the grid show where congestion
(losses and constraints) occur and represent
the direct cost of transmission.9 Under a
decentralised system these prices provide
incentives for bid and offer adjustments as
well as act as network investment signals. 
The prices and quantities at the nodes in the
grid reconcile the different expectations of the
various market participants. This occurs
because from the bids and offers of different
parties that may have different expectations
the auctioneer chooses only those that match
demand and supply at least cost. The prices
may or may not be replicated in a centralised
system, but even if they were they would not
imply incentives for actions to be taken as a
result.
As with any commodity market,
predictions of future market conditions are
very difficult as they reconcile both
expectations of the future and expectations
about what other participants think of the
future.  The electricity industry in New Zealand
provides the advantage of ensuring that
competitive tension between generators
increases the payoff to accurate assessments 
of the value of investment in future generation
capacity.  Investment decisions in the 
New Zealand electricity market reflect 
diverse expectations of the future including
expectations about the performance of
potential investments in renewable energy 
and other fuel sources.10
7  In these we assume that gas is the
marginal fuel.
8 Marginal cost is the cost of one
additional unit generated.  There is
typically no unique marginal cost as it
depends upon expectations of the future
about factors such as fuel prices and
technical change.
9 Nodal price differentials essentially give
the price of transmitting electricity
between them. 
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It has been argued that competitive spot
prices on a grid will not be high enough to
cover the fixed cost element of generation
costs and therefore that the resultant level of
investment in generation may be too low. In
fact, it will never be economically worthwhile
to invest in a grid to the point that all
constraints and losses are eliminated.  There is
thus no reason to expect prices and revenue 
to be so low as to not cover fixed costs of
generation. Under the decentralised structure,
in contradistinction to the centralised
approach, the short run fuel cost of water in
times of shortage is much higher than it is at
other times. These periods provide rents that
go to covering fixed costs and justify
maintenance of, perhaps older higher cost,
generation plant the practical use for which 
is limited to periods of high prices driven by
fuel shortages. 
Both the demand for electricity and the
availability of fuel to generate electricity may
vary to a significant extent through time.  
The storage of the New Zealand hydrological
system is very low by world standards but it is
unlikely to be desirable to build an electricity
system which functions “normally” in even the
most extreme hydrological and climatic
conditions.  It may be extremely costly to build
generation capacity that allows the electricity
industry to survive dry winters without
significant increases in prices, since the cost 
of the additional generation capacity required
over and above that for a normal year will be
built into the base costs of the generators.  
In other words, cost increases in years when
fuel is in short supply can only be avoided by
building generation capacity that will increase
all electricity prices across the market in all
years.  Those firms who are now expressing
concern about the impact of high prices on
their profitability have in the past had the
benefits of lower prices resulting from the
decision not to build generation capacity
capable of dealing with every dry year
scenario. 
The incentives for investment are to a
significant extent affected by factors that are
external to the industry.  In particular,
Government policy settings relating to the
environment may be particularly important 
in any assessment of both the cost of gaining
approval for and building new generation
capacity, as well as the payoffs to the
operation of that generation capacity.  In this
respect, the Government ’s acceptance of the
Kyoto Agreement, potential changes to the
Resource Management Act, and evolving
policies on conservation and renewable energy
sources signal significant but as yet unspecified
changes in costs (level of specific taxes)
relating to different sources of fuel in the
industry. 
Central Planning 
Applied to Electricity 
Central planning is now thoroughly discredited
as a model for the organisation of the
economy as a whole.  The poor social,
economic and environmental conditions of
the countries that formerly made up the Soviet
bloc provide ample evidence to support this
view.11 Centralised control in democratic
systems raises some different issues, but the
core problems of central planning transcend
different political systems. 
Central planning requires that the
competitive tension relating to current
operations and future investment, and the
prices and contracts which co-ordinate this
decision-making, be replaced by and
internalised within a bureaucracy.  The staff
of the planning agency may undertake
vigorous debate about the level, type and
location of investment, but this can never
replicate the outcome of a market structure.
While the view may be reached by consensus
and may incorporate a portfolio of activities, it
10 See Chris Daniels, “Outlook brighter for
New Zealand’s power problems”, The
New Zealand Herald, 4/5/03 for a list of
diverse generation sources contemplated
and their state of approval and comment
on investment since 1996. 
11 See, for example, World Development
Report 1996, published for the World
Bank by Oxford University Press, 1996.
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cannot enable different (competing) views to
be applied in a way in which decision makers
are accountable for their actions.  In fact,
reaching a consensus generally entails trade-
offs that eliminate the more remote and
innovative prospects.  For example,
competition has produced consumer gains by
providing generation investment in locations
that are closer to load than was true under the
centralised ECNZ system. 
A key difference between centrally-
planned and competitive industry structures is
in their use of prices.  In competitive markets
higher prices provide information about
demand and supply, and about the likely
return to investment in new generation and/or
transmission capacity.  Higher prices are both
the signal that new investment capacity would
be an efficient use of society’s scarce resources
and an incentive for generators to undertake
that investment.  At the same time, higher
prices provide those using electricity with
incentives to conserve it, including through
investment in more efficient appliances.12
In contrast, one of the key problems with
central planning is the fact that the plan
cannot be based on the signals provided by
market prices precisely because the market is
absent.  Planning systems may create
administered prices, but these are complex
and imperfect substitutes for the prices formed
in markets through the self-interest decisions
of actual market participants. Administered
prices in centrally-planned markets are
generally more rigid (since the planning
structure is slower than markets in responding
to new information) and less directly related to
the key costs in the industry.  For example, in
electricity a government agency may set the
price of electricity at the long-run costs of
generation, but this will not provide
consumers or any commercial entity planning
investment with appropriate signals about the
scarcity of energy.  Price variation over time in
response to hydrological conditions reflects the
varying scarcity of water in ways that
administered prices cannot. 
Central planning and management
performs poorly where technological change is
occurring.  This is because technical change is
by its nature inherently uncertain.  In a
competitive market uncertainty will be
reflected in different firms adopting and
developing different technologies.  Central
planning and management has no role for this
type of decentralised decision making, and
essentially imposes “all or nothing” techno-
logical choices on the industry.  
These all or nothing choices make it
clear that central planning in the electricity
industry would have an impact on the
economy as a whole.  The planned outcome is
one that consumers of electricity have to live
with, whether or not it is optimal, because the
planning system precludes the implemen-
tation of alternative strategies by (for example)
different generators and the reaction by those
utilising electricity according to the state of the
system.  The planning process may meet the
needs of the largest firms in the economy
because they will be most effective in
communicating and having their needs
incorporated into the planning process, but
the broader evolution of electricity demand in
New Zealand will be much less certain, and
difficult to incorporate into the planning
process. Nor will it enable appropriate
valuations of resources imparted by prices that
would affect the activities of other actual and
potential industries. 
Central planning will consistently result
in misallocation of resources for major
investment projects.  This is because the
incentive of managers within the planning
system is to get government to commit to
projects by underestimating their costs and
overestimating their benefits.13 Once the
project is approved, the absence of
12 Specifically, the current increase in prices
serves to induce thermal generation to
replace  hydro-generation and demand
side reductions to conserve water. 
13 This leg may also occur in de-centralised
enterprise.
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commercial incentives to contain costs and
meet deadlines further undermines the
efficiency of the investment.  In New Zealand,
the Marsden B generator provides the pre-
eminent example of the costs of centrally-
planned electricity generation investment,
though the underinvestment in telephone
network capacity by the state monopoly in 
the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates that this
was not an isolated problem.14 In addition,
the centralised ECNZ coped badly with its
forecasts, investment and low-inflow years in
the past.15 Electricity prices set under the
competitive market structure have on average
been well below those which the centralised
ECNZ sought approval for in 1991, and there 
is no reason to expect that a return to
centralised management would result in better
performance.   
The rationale for central planning is
usually couched in terms of national economic
benefits, but in practice central planning is
usually the outcome of a political process that
is designed to provide benefits for particular
groups in society.  For example, higher prices
for electricity impose costs on businesses that
are heavy users of electricity and exposed to
the spot market price, but this should not be
confused as being in conflict with the national
interest.  Moreover, democratic political
systems increase the complexity of discerning
the “national interest” from the planning
perspective, because different governments
have different views and the actions of the
current government do not bind future
governments.  In these circumstances,
subsidising those industries that are heavy
users of electricity would be more efficient,
and provide for greater political accountability,
than the imposition of a central planning
system.  
Conclusion16
The prospect of shortages of electricity this
winter does not indicate any failure of the
competitive market structure. In addition,
there is nothing about the history of central
planning in New Zealand or in other countries
that suggests that we could be confident that it
would have avoided the current problems
facing the electricity industry or that it can do
so in the future.  Central planners are no more
able to foresee the future than are managers
of competing firms.  They suffer the
disadvantage of not having price signals
formed from the interaction of competing
firms in the market to guide their views about
the scarcity of energy and the payoff to new
investment.  
The critical events underlying the
prospect of a power shortage are by their
nature all extremely difficult to forecast. The
sudden writedown of reserves reminds us of
the very great uncertainty of gas-field capacity
even when the fields are known and being
utilised. This is particularly a problem in New
Zealand where we have so few fields. The
economic output of the economy and the
price of methanol are each very hard to
forecast: even so, those whose welfare
depends upon forecasts of these factors must
reach a view about their levels in the future.
Normally, in such cases it is better to have
multiple guesses and actions taken about the
future than the imposition of a single view as
under central administration.  In the case of
electricity, some form of regulation is required
but it need not remove advantageous
elements of decentralised decision making. 
New Zealand may be entering a period
which is fundamentally unlike the past in that
there is not a plentiful supply of gas, water is
scarce, there are additional environmental
constraints and there is even more uncertainty
about optimal investment strategies.  Pending
technological innovation and the sudden
14 Real prices and investment approvals
fluctuated substantially over time and by
the mid 1980s there was substantial
congestion.“The Economic Efficiency of
Telecommunications in a Deregulated
Market: the case of New Zealand”, with
David Boles de Boer, The Economic
Record, 72, 24-35, 1996.
15 See John Culy, Electricity Restructuring:
towards a wholesale electricity market,
NZIER, 37, 1992, and Galvin BV, Secretary
to the Treasury.  Review of Electricity
Planning and Electricity Generation  Costs
(Treasury Paper to Minister of Finance).
Wellington March 1985 [the McLaughlin
report].,
16 In this short note we have not examined
certain issues. We consider that they
would enrich but not  change our review
of the pros and cons of centralised
decision making. These include the
controversial issues of vertical integration
of retail and generation and the vertical
separation of lines and energy. We note
that both forms of integration have some
synergies: vertical integration in  the
management of risk, and lines and
energy in managing network losses and
electricity to households. We take the
same point about the state owned
generators, while they are separate
entities we consider that they are an
important part of a decentralised system
that has competitive pressures.  Finally,
we note that if there are substantial
economies of scale in electricity,
centralised management may lower costs
over a decentralised system: however,
this comes at the cost of competitive
tension that normally engenders more
innovation and dynamic change.
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discovery of large gas reserves, all the
economic and policy signals suggest higher
real costs of energy in the future, no matter
what the system. Thus, it is likely to be more
important than in the past that all facets of
the economy face the opportunity costs of the
resources they use.  Economic history tells us
that this is difficult to achieve in a centralised
system. The ability of foresters, farmers,
fishers, canoeists and hydro generators 
(for example) to reconcile their water demands 
in times of plenty and scarcity requires 
consideration of the value of water in
alternative uses. These reconciliations will
ideally vary with localised and national water
conditions, changing demand and local issues.
Decentralised decision-making in markets with
prices that reflect these choices will provide
the most effective means of managing
competing demands in the future.
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